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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fact that a cat, an ordinary household pet, could be a violator of 
a federal statute should be troubling to all people.1  Of course, a cat 
∗ J.D. Candidate, The University of Akron School of Law, 2014.  I would like to thank Professor 
Kalyani Robbins for sharing her expertise and encouraging me to find a realistic solution to this 
problem.  In addition, I owe a special thanks to my family for always supporting me. 
 1.  See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1212-13 (D. N.D. 
2012) (explaining that some of the most common killers of migratory birds are cats).  Cats, domes-
tic or wild, kill between 1.4 billion and 3.7 billion birds in the United States each year.  Chuck 
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would never be prosecuted; however, this absurd hypothetical presents 
the reality of the expansive reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (the 
“MBTA” or the “Act”).2  The interpretation of the MBTA should be one 
of strict liability, but the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the 
“FWS”), the enforcement agency for the Act, should grant permits for 
incidental takings similar to those listed under the Endangered Species 
Act.  This solution will create certainty in the law and conform to the 
spirit of the MBTA, while giving commercial entities the option of 
avoiding criminal liability.  Today, whether an action that causes the 
death of a migratory bird is a violation of the MBTA hinges on either the 
breadth of the district court’s interpretation of the Act3 or the discretion 
of the government on whether it should prosecute the violation at all.4 
The MBTA is different than protection laws for other species be-
cause it only provides for criminal sanctions and does not provide an ex-
ception for an incidental take.5  Some federal courts are interpreting the 
MBTA narrowly and holding that activities indirectly or unintentionally 
causing the death of a migratory bird are not a violation of the MBTA.6  
Raasch, Cats Kill Up to 3.7 Billion Birds Annually, USA TODAY, Jan. 30, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/29/cats-wild-birds-mammals-study/1873871/. 
 2.  The Migratory Bird Treaty Act states that: 
it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, 
capture, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, bar-
ter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be 
shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be trans-
ported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or 
export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, 
whether or not manufacture, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such 
bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of the conventions between 
the United States and Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds . . . the United 
States and the United Mexican States for the protection of migratory birds and game 
mammals . . . the United States and the Government of Japan for the protection of migra-
tory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment . . . and the conven-
tion between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the con-
servation of migratory birds and their environments. 
16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a) (2004). 
 3.  See Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (holding that the MBTA’s “take” provi-
sion only includes acts that are direct or intentional toward birds); but see United States v. Apollo 
Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that the MBTA does not have a scienter 
requirement and, thus, is strict liability regardless of whether the act was unintentional).  
 4.  Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1197 (2008).  The United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service exercises prosecutorial discretion to decide which actors will be prosecuted for 
violations of the MBTA.  Id. 
 5.  Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Climate Change Urgently 
Requires a Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, 42 ENVTL. L. 1101, 
1138 (2012). 
 6.  Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1212-1213; see also United States v. ConocoPhil-
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However, other courts are interpreting the scope of the MBTA more 
broadly and holding that the MBTA is a strict liability statute: if the ac-
tor caused the death of a migratory bird, regardless of whether the actor 
intended to do so, it is a violation.7  The different rulings of the federal 
courts ultimately come down to their interpretation of the word “take” in 
the MBTA language.8  This split among the federal district courts has 
created, and will continue to create, drastically conflicting results across 
the United States.  This uncertainty gives insecure guidance to any per-
son undertaking some kind of action that could possibly cause the death 
of a migratory bird.9 
This Comment will focus on the widely different interpretations, 
applications, and enforcement of the MBTA and the consequences that 
will result if a concrete solution is not implemented soon.  Part II will 
discuss the background, historically and legislatively, that led to the en-
actment of the MBTA and its current implementation.  Part III will dis-
cuss the current conflict within the courts regarding how the MBTA is to 
be applied.  In discussing this conflict, this section looks at the particular 
reasoning behind two of the most recent decisions on this issue and what 
led each of the courts to different interpretations.  Part IV will analyze 
the correct interpretation of the MBTA and the scope of its liability; ex-
plain the need for an immediate and effective solution for the implemen-
tation of the statute and why certain other solutions are not workable; 
and, lastly, analyze the integration of a permit program, like that under 
the Endangered Species Act, and explain why this will create the best 
immediate solution. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE MBTA 
The lack of bird conservation in the 19th century and the over-
eagerness to kill birds caused a downward spiral in bird populations.10  
A preservation measure had to be put in place to prevent further popula-
lips Co., No. 4:11-po-002, 2011 WL 4709887 (D. N.D. Aug. 10, 2011); United States v. Chevron 
USA, Inc., No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009). 
 7.  See generally United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010); see 
also United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp.2d 1070 (D. Col. 1999); United States 
v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 8.  16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a) (2004). 
 9.  Sandra A. Snodgrass, It’s for the Birds – Recent Developments Under the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act and Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 2 ROCKY MNT. MIN. L. FOUND. PROC. 10A 
(2012). 
 10.  George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 167-68 (1979). 
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tion decreases, but enforcement and implementation were slow.11  Once 
the support for protection grew strong enough, Congress enacted the 
MBTA to help rejuvenate the bird populations and protect them from fu-
ture harm.12  Since its enactment, the MBTA has overcome multiple 
hurdles and has become stronger than ever in its implementation—but 
not without a few critics.13 
A. Early History of Bird Conservation 
During the 1800s and into the early 1900s, migratory bird popula-
tions were quickly decreasing due to “unchecked overharvesting.”14  
During this time, state regulation of hunting game birds was a very slow 
process; enforcement and acceptance of any such regulations were even 
slower to take hold within the American community.15  Birds continued 
to be intentionally killed, and populations dropped because of the “de-
mand for pies and fancy feathers” and the alleged “right to blast away at 
any species affording food, profit, or sport.”16 
The bird martyr that became the face of bird conservation reform 
was the passenger pigeon.17  In the late 1800s, around five billion of 
these birds would “darken the sky for many hours in [their] cross-
country migrations.”18  Tragically, these birds were extinct by 1900.19  
The primary suspect for causing their sad demise was the class of com-
mercial hunters who sought to kill the pigeons for their meat or for 
sport.20  Though the passenger pigeon is given the martyr title, other bird 
species were also extinct by the end of the 1800s: the heath hen, the 
golden plover, and the Eskimo curlew.21  The rapid increase in the 
amount of hunting in the country forced some birds to become a mere 
memory.22 
 11.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1177-78. 
 12.  Id. at 1176-77. 
 13.  George Cameron Coggins, Federal Wildlife Law Achieves Adolescence: Developments in 
the 1970s, 1978 DUKE L. J. 753, 764 (1978). 
 14.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1176.  During this time, the norm was for the early 
American settlers to shoot game birds for their food value and to hunt birds that posed a danger to 
the safety of the community.  Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 167. 
 15.  Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 168. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 2. 
 18.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1177-78. 
 19.  Id. at 1178. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  “[T]he hunting of birds for their fashionable feathers to adorn women’s hats and dec-
orate the platters of fancy restaurants had reduced many species to mere remnants of their historical 
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In 1900, Congress attempted to regulate wildlife exploitation by 
passing the Lacey Act.23  This statute sought to regulate wildlife com-
merce by making it a federal crime to transport illegally killed animals 
across state lines.24  The Lacey Act’s goal failed when a substantial 
black market arose because of the statute’s lack of enforcement power.25 
In 1913, Congress tried again to preserve bird species by passing 
the Weeks-McLean Law of 1913.26  This statute again prohibited ship-
ment of migratory birds across state lines but additionally made it un-
lawful to shoot these birds except in accordance with certain hunting 
regulations.27  However, the demise of the Weeks-McLean Law came 
quickly as individuals who were prosecuted under the statute challenged 
its constitutionality as being outside of the powers given to Congress and 
in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.28  
In both United States v. Shauver29 and United States v. McCullagh,30 the 
Weeks-McLean Law of 1913 was deemed unconstitutional.31 
B. The MBTA as the Solution 
In 1916, the United States and Canada, through Great Britain, en-
tered into a treaty whereby the nations sought to protect migratory birds 
that were “useful to man or harmless”32 and that faced danger due to in-
adequate protection while nesting or travelling to and from breeding 
grounds.33  In 1918, Congress enacted and President Woodrow Wilson 
populations.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 23.  Id. at 1177.  This statute was the first attempt by the federal government to prevent the 
unfortunate event of species endangerment or extinction.  Id. 
 24.  Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 168.  Most environmental statutes provide for a crimi-
nal punishment because the mere threat of a criminal penalty will normally receive more compli-
ance than an actual civil penalty.  Alex Arensberg, Note, Are Migratory Birds Extending Environ-
mental Criminal Liability?, 38 ECOLOGY. L. Q. 427, 428 (2011).  “Corporations that violate 
environmental civil regulations often simply internalize their cost of noncompliance without ever 
adjusting their unlawful impact on the environment.”  Id. 
 25.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1178.   
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 169.  Congress was faced with critics stating that the 
federal government did not have the authority to regulate wildlife.  Id.  In response, Congress de-
clared that the United States had a duty to protect the birds.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914). 
 30.  United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 295-96 (D. Kan. 1915). 
 31.  Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 169.  The government appealed the decision to the 
United States Supreme Court, and it was granted review; however, before the appeal was ever de-
cided, the treaty between the United States and Canada had already begun creating a new solution – 
one that would work.  Id. 
 32.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1179 (internal quotations omitted). 
 33.  Robb Wolfson, Note, Birds at a Crossroads: Strategies for Augmenting the MBTA’s 
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signed the MBTA to protect these birds from endangerment, or worse – 
extinction.34  In 1920, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the 
constitutionality of the MBTA in Missouri v. Holland,35 holding that it 
fell within the treaty power of the federal government.36 
Subsequent treaties were entered into with Mexico, Japan, and Rus-
sia to contribute more protection to birds under the MBTA.37  Most no-
table was the treaty with Mexico, which provided that the President of 
either country could periodically add bird species to the protection of the 
treaty and, thus, the MBTA.38  In 1971, President Richard Nixon dele-
gated this power to the Secretary of the Interior who then designated al-
most every bird species as migratory and, thus, under the protection of 
the MBTA.39  The MBTA has since incorporated all four of the treaties’ 
objectives.40 
The MBTA, because of its wide range of protection measures, be-
came the cornerstone for modern federal wildlife conservation law.41  
The Act protects more than 1,000 species of migratory birds native to 
the United States or specifically mentioned in corresponding treaties, in-
Sway over Federal Lands, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 535, 537 (2003).  An interesting point about this 
treaty is that it seems that the motivation behind it was actually a strategy by the United States to 
create a federal statute that would be backed by treaty power and, thus, could withstand constitu-
tional review, unlike its two previous counterparts.  Id. 
 34.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1179.  By killing the birds, hunters were allowing the 
insects to roam free and destroy the food supply that was direly needed for the war effort.  Benjamin 
Means, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 831 (1998). 
 35.  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 36.  Id. at 435. 
 37.  Wolfson, supra note 33, at 537-38.  The treaties became effective in 1936, 1972, and 
1978, respectively.  Id 
 38.  Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 171-72.  In 1971, President Nixon delegated this pow-
er to the Secretary of the Interior who then designated almost every bird species as migratory and, 
thus, under the protection of the MBTA.  Wolfson, supra note 33, at 538.  Also notable, the treaties 
with Japan and Russia both added to the preservation by seeking to protect bird habitats.  Id. 
 39.  Wolfson, supra note 33, at 538. 
 40.  16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a) (2004). 
It shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, 
capture, kill . . . any migratory bird . . . included in the terms of the conventions between 
the United States and Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds concluded Au-
gust 16, 1916 (39 Stat. 1702), the United States and the United Mexican States for the 
protection of migratory birds and game mammals concluded February 7, 1936, the Unit-
ed States and the Government of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in 
danger of extinction, and their environment concluded March 4, 1972 and the convention 
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the conserva-
tion of migratory birds and their environments concluded November 19, 1976. 
Id. 
 41.  Coggins, supra note 13, at 764. 
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cluding, but not limited to, “songbirds, waterfowl, shorebirds, seabirds, 
wading birds, and raptors.”42  The MBTA states that “it shall be unlaw-
ful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, 
capture, kill . . . any migratory bird” unless the actor is permitted to do 
so under corresponding regulations.43  The Act gives the power of en-
forcement to the Secretary of the Interior.44  In turn, the Secretary of the 
Interior has given its authority under the MBTA to the FWS.45  The 
FWS has the authority to grant permits to certain actors that will techni-
cally violate the statute by directly and intentionally killing a migratory 
bird.46  Most significantly, however, the FWS does not give permits to 
actors who will indirectly take or kill a bird under the Act during an oth-
erwise lawful activity.47 
On Jan. 10, 2001, President Bill Clinton enacted Executive Order 
13186, “Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory 
Birds,” which directed federal agencies to take the necessary steps to 
protect and preserve migratory birds.48  The order calls for the agencies 
to be proactive in protecting birds.49  For example, federal agencies are 
to submit an outline to the FWS of how the agency plans to promote 
preservation of the birds,50 support specialized planning efforts,51 and 
report annually on how many birds were “taken” that year.52  Unfortu-
nately, an agency’s cooperation and participation in accordance with the 
Executive Order does not earn it any leeway under the MBTA.53  If the 
agency kills a migratory bird, and the violation is one the government 
 42.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 3.  The MBTA is considered one of the most expansive spe-
cies preservation statutes because it not only protects bird species that are common and people may 
experience every day, but also it protects those bird populations that are endangered or severely de-
clining.  Id.  The species range from “barn swallows and turkey vultures to bald eagles and spotted 
owls.”  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1180. 
 43.  16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a). 
 44.  16 U.S.C.A. § 704 (1998). 
 45.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1180. 
 46.  Id.  The details of the MBTA’s current permit program will be discussed infra Part IV.C. 
 47.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 3.  “Indirectly” can include, for example, resource exploration 
and development.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 6. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  These outlines are called Memorandums of Understanding.  Id.  The FWS has received 
memorandums from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, U.S. Forest Service, Bu-
reau of Land Management, Minerals Management Service, National Parks Service, and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission.  Id. 
 51.  These planning efforts included programs such as the Partners-in-Flight Initiative and the 
North American Waterfowl Management Plan.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
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decides to prosecute, the agency will be found criminally liable.54 
Although the statute has been highly controversial since its enact-
ment,55 “[t]he origins of modern federal wildlife law may be traced back 
to the MBTA.”56  With a settled strict liability interpretation of the stat-
ute and an effective limiting measure attached to it, the MBTA can truly 
become the paramount source of bird protection for generations to come. 
III. THE PROBLEM 
This section discusses the current conflict among the district courts 
across the country that are faced with an incidental take violation under 
the MBTA.  The different interpretations are not subtle differences in 
holdings – they are in complete contrast to each other.57  The different 
interpretations of the Act have given rise to a severe lack of uniformity 
in its application and an unpredictability that is halting projects and eco-
nomic development.58  This section then goes into more detail about the 
differing interpretations and the reasoning behind them by looking more 
closely at two of the most recent MBTA cases. 
A. Conflict Among the Courts 
Within the last few years, district courts have given the MBTA’s 
misdemeanor provision one of two interpretations: strict liability59 or ex-
cluding lawful, incidental activity.60  There is no established governing 
standard or guidance for the lower federal courts because there have on-
ly been two appellate cases that discuss the issue of an incidental tak-
ing.61  Courts will continue to produce different rulings on liability under 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Coggins, supra note 13, at 766. 
 56.  Id. at 764. 
 57.  See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1214 (D. N.D. 
2012) (holding that only unlawful activity which indirectly kills a migratory bird is in violation of 
the MBTA); but see United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. 
Colo. 1999). 
 58.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
 59.  United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d 841 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Moon 
Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999). 
 60.  Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1214; United States v. ConocoPhillips, No. 4:11-
po-002, 2011 WL 4709887, at *3 (D. N.D. Aug. 10, 2011); United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 
09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009). 
 61.  See generally United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (involving an 
actor who was found liable because his substances in his runoff ponds killed birds); see also United 
States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010) (involving an oil production company 
that trapped birds in one of their machines).  The problem with having only these two appellate cas-
es to look to is that FMC Corp. is more than 30 years old and Apollo Energies employed a proxi-
 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss2/7
07 FIEST MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2014  9:29 AM 
2014] DEFINING THE WINGSPAN 595 
the MBTA for incidental killings of migratory birds until a uniform solu-
tion is adopted that solves the issue of how exactly to apply strict liabil-
ity under the MBTA.62 
Most recently, the court in United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 
L.P.63 and similar preceding courts have refused to apply the general rule 
of strict liability to an incidental taking of a migratory bird during lawful 
commercial activity.64  In Brigham Oil & Gas and United States v. 
ConocoPhillips, several birds were found dead next to the oil compa-
nies’ open reserve pits.65  In United States v. Chevron,66 birds became 
trapped and died between walls of the caisson67 and the wellhead at an 
oil well site.68  These courts adopted the argument that the term “take” 
contained within the MBTA’s prohibitions requires an act that was in-
tentionally geared toward killing or trapping a migratory bird.69  This ar-
gument was premised upon the belief that “take” in its plain meaning is 
an intentional activity.70  These courts ultimately held that the MBTA 
does not prohibit commercial industries from incidentally killing migra-
tory birds if they are engaged in a lawful activity.71  As will be explained 
below, this is an incorrect reading of the MBTA, and these particular de-
fendants should have been found in violation of the Act for taking a mi-
gratory bird, regardless of whether their activities were lawful or unlaw-
ful. 
Other district courts have interpreted the MBTA broadly, imposing 
mate cause requirement, which is not in accordance with strict liability.  Kalyani Robbins, Paved 
with Good Intentions: The Fate of Strict Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 42 ENVTL. 
L. 579, 598-99 (2012). 
 62.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 583. 
 63.  Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202. 
 64.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 4. 
 65.  Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. at 1205; ConocoPhillips, 2011 WL 4709887, at *1. 
 66.  United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170 (W.D. La. Oct. 
30, 2009). 
 67.  A caisson resembles a large pipe surrounding the entire outer wall of the wellhead.  Id. at 
*1.  Part of it is submerged beneath the water, and approximately six feet of it sticks out from the 
surface of the water.  Id.  The caisson is installed to protect the wellhead from being damaged by 
boats hitting it.  Id. 
 68.  Id.  A wellhead is “the top of or a structure built over a well.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1421 (11th ed. 2004). 
 69.  Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. at 1208-09.  See Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. 
United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Strict liability may be appropriate 
when dealing with hunters and poachers.  But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the 
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct . . . that indirectly 
results in the death of migratory birds.”). 
 70.  Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. at 1208-09. 
 71.  Id. at 1214; ConocoPhillips, 2011 WL 4709887, at *3; Chevron, 2009 WL 3645170, at 
*3. 
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strict liability, and have stated that indirect takings of migratory birds 
will be held in violation of the Act.72  In United States v. Moon Lake 
Electric Association, the defendant installed electric power poles in an 
area where there were very few trees; birds took to the electric poles to 
perch and make nests, causing several bird deaths.73  In contrast to the 
Brigham Oil & Gas trilogy, the Moon Lake court determined that, based 
on the plain language of the statute and the Congressional intent behind 
it, the MBTA indeed includes incidental or unintentional acts toward 
birds.74  Based on this interpretation, the court held that the defendants 
were violators of the MBTA because they killed migratory birds without 
a permit, and that is all that is required under strict liability.75 
This recent division among the federal district courts has created 
two different interpretations of the MBTA.  These varying decisions by 
the courts have created confusion and uncertainty among the actors who 
might potentially violate the Act.  If prosecuted under the MBTA, they 
do not know which interpretation will be applied – and the difference in 
the interpretations is extreme: either the actor is a criminal, or he is not. 
B. Two Cases with Two Different Interpretations 
In United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., the government filed 
allegations in the District Court for the District of North Dakota against 
Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P. and two other neighboring oil and gas produc-
tion companies for taking migratory birds in violation of the MBTA.76  
The birds were “taken” by flying into or near the companies’ oil reserve 
pits,77 and they were unable to fly away because they were covered in 
oil.78 
 72.  See generally United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. 
Colo. 1999); see also United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that an indirect taking of a migratory bird will be a violation under the MBTA so long as the de-
fendant’s actions proximately caused the death of the bird). 
 73.  Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
 74.  Id. at 1073-74. 
 75.  Id. at 1088.  The defendants could be in violation of the statute because the electric com-
pany in Moon Lake was moving for dismissal of the case, and all the court was asked to do was de-
termine whether to grant the motion.  Id. at 1071. 
 76.  United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204-06 (D. N.D. 
2012).  Newfield Production Company and Continental Resources, Inc. were the other two oil com-
panies involved in the action.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 1204.  Oil reserve pits are “lawful areas near gas and oil drilling operations that are 
used to contain drill cuttings and other byproducts of the drilling.”  Norman L. Reimer, When It 
Comes to Overcriminalization, Prosecutorial Discretion Is for the Birds, THE CHAMPION 9 (Oct. 
2012). 
 78.  Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. at 1204-06.  Two Mallards were found in Brigham 
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The district court did not hesitate before stating that “take” under 
the MBTA “refers to conduct directed at birds, such as hunting or 
poaching, and not acts or omissions having merely the incidental or un-
intended effect of causing bird deaths.”79  The court determined that 
“take” required a direct or intentional act by first looking at the plain 
meaning of the word, as the statute itself does not define the term.80 
In furtherance of its reasoning, the court compared the ordinary 
meaning of “take” with the definition of “take” in FWS regulations and 
found that the regulations’ definition of “take” included only purposeful 
or intended effects on birds.81  In addition, the court stated that courts in 
general are required to interpret criminal statutes narrowly when the 
statute’s terms are uncertain.82  The court also reasoned that if “take” 
was to encompass incidental activities, liability would extend to many 
every day activities, such as “cutting brush and trees, and planting and 
harvesting crops.”83 
The court found that oil and gas production activities, namely oil 
reserve pits, are not the kind of activities that can be found in violation 
of the MBTA because they “are not directed at birds or their habitats,” 
and therefore, the three oil companies were not in violation of the 
MBTA.84  The court developed the rule that “lawful commercial activity 
which may indirectly cause the death of migratory birds does not consti-
tute a federal crime.”85  This is one interpretation of the MBTA that has 
been recognized by multiple courts, as stated above.86 
In United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., the District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas convicted Citgo on three counts of “unlawful-
ly taking and aiding and abetting the taking of migratory birds” in viola-
tion of the MBTA in 2007.87  Birds were able to fly into uncovered oil 
Oil’s oil reserve pit.  Id. at 1204.  Two Mallards, one Northern Pintail, and one Red-Necked Duck 
were found at Newfield Production’s site.  Id. at 1205.  One Say’s Phoebe was found in Continental 
Resource’s pit.  Id. at 1206. 
 79.  Id. at 1208 (emphasis added). 
 80.  Id. at 1208-09.  Looking at the Webster’s Dictionary definition, “take” means to use con-
trol or power to gain possession over something or, specifically aimed at fish or game, to get pos-
session by killing or capturing.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 1209.  The regulations define “take” as “to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect . . .”  50 C.F.R. § 10.12. 
 82.  Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. at 1211. 
 83.  Id. at 1212. 
 84.  Id. at 1211, 1214. 
 85.  Id. at 1214. 
 86.  See generally United States v. ConocoPhillips Co., No. 4:11-po-002, 2011 WL 4709887 
(D. N.D. Aug. 10, 2011); United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170 
(W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009). 
 87.  United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d 841, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2012).  In a 
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tanks and, once they landed in the oil, were unable to escape and died.88  
The court found that this taking was a violation under the MBTA.89  Cit-
go then moved to vacate the district court’s convictions under the 
MBTA, which led to the decision upon which this Comment is fo-
cused.90 
In its motion to vacate, Citgo’s primary contention was that the 
MBTA does not apply to commercial activities that unintentionally kill 
migratory birds; instead, it only applies in circumstances of “hunting, 
trapping, poaching, or similar means.”91  The government argued con-
versely, stating that the MBTA applies to activities beyond hunting and 
poaching and could reach businesses that kill migratory birds because of 
the “at any time, by any means or in any manner” language of the 
MBTA.92 
The court acknowledged the differing interpretations among the 
federal courts: (1) liability for activities similar to hunting and poaching 
versus (2) liability for any conduct that takes or kills a migratory bird.93  
The court then impliedly adopted the Brigham Oil & Gas rule, stated 
above, that lawful conduct that incidentally kills a migratory bird is not a 
violation of the MBTA.94  However, once the court determined that Cit-
go’s tanks were not lawfully operated,95 it changed its analysis to one of 
strict liability, following the Tenth Circuit,96 and affirmed that the 
separate trial during the same time, Citgo Petroleum was also convicted of violating the Clean Air 
Act because it never installed roofs on its tanks at the refinery plant, which was part of an emission 
control regulation.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id.  The motion to vacate was based on the argument that the government failed to state 
an offense under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.  Id.  The rule allows for a pre-trial motion 
alleging a “defect in instituting the prosecution.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A). 
 91.  Id.  Citgo used the ruling in Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P. to support its argument.  Id. at 845. 
 92.  Id. at 842. The MBTA states that it is “unlawful at any time, by any means or in any 
manner, to pursue, hunt, take . . . any migratory bird.”  16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a) (2004). 
 93.  Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d at 843.  Moreover, courts cannot even agree on 
the intent of Congress in enacting the MBTA. See Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. United States 
Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that “take” and “kill” under the MBTA 
means activity that is the kind engaged in by hunters and poachers because this was the intent of 
Congress at the time of its enactment); but see United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 
F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (D. Colo. 1999) (explaining that Congress intended the MBTA to include 
acts besides hunting and poaching because it included many activities that could be a violation). 
 94.  Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d at 846-47. 
 95.  Id. at 847. 
 96.  United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 690 (10th Cir. 2010).  The court 
held that the “take” provision in the MBTA did not contain a scienter requirement and, thus, was 
strict liability.  Id. at 686.  However, the court understood the broad reach the Act could have and 
held that the MBTA also requires that the defendant proximately caused the violation.  Id. at 690.  
This Comment will not analyze the proximate cause requirement the Tenth Circuit employed, but it 
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MBTA is a strict liability statute.97  Under the strict liability application 
of the MBTA, the court found that Citgo did violate the Act when it 
failed to cover the oil tanks, again emphasizing that the failure to cover 
the tanks was unlawful, and birds were killed as a result.98 
In conclusion, there are district courts like the one in Brigham Oil 
& Gas that reject the strict liability application of the MBTA by ruling 
that lawful activity that kills a bird is exempt.  On the other hand, district 
courts like that in Citgo Petroleum Corp. rule that the statute is strict lia-
bility.  With this divide, some actors are convicted, while others, con-
ducting very similar activities, are let off the hook. 
IV. SOLVING THE MBTA ISSUE 
The MBTA has been called a “heady combination of strict liability, 
criminal penalty provisions, and vague language,”99 proving that con-
cretely establishing an accepted interpretation and application will be 
difficult to achieve.  Part A of this section analyzes the correct interpre-
tation of the MBTA’s misdemeanor violation and, specifically, whether 
it includes unintentional acts.  Part B looks at the range of consequences 
of the statute’s broad reach and why the current limiting solution is not 
effective.  Lastly, Part C analyzes the proposed solution of implementing 
an incidental take permit program into the MBTA. 
A. Interpretation of the MBTA 
Before a solution can be proposed on how to limit the scope of the 
MBTA, the interpretation of the Act must be confirmed.  The majority of 
authorities hold that the misdemeanor penalty under the statute is one of 
strict liability.100  Furthermore, the MBTA’s strict liability application 
results in the confirmation that incidental takings are included within the 
is interesting to note that courts applying strict liability recognize the broad implications of the Act 
and seek some limitation on its reach. 
 97.  Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d at 847.  If the court truly meant to hold that the 
MBTA misdemeanor provision was one of strict liability, then its distinction of lawful activity ver-
sus unlawful activity is irrelevant because “strict liability is liability without fault.”  Robbins, supra 
note 61, at 604. 
 98.  Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d at 848. 
 99.  Means, supra note 34, at 824. 
 100.  These authorities include the text of the statute, 16 U.S.C.A. § 703; the legislative intent, 
S. Rep. No. 99-445, at 16 (1986) (“Nothing in this amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liabil-
ity’ standard for misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a), a standard which has been up-
held in many Federal court decisions.”); and the concept of public welfare offenses in the environ-
mental context.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 583. 
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MBTA.101  This section analyzes the authorities that demonstrate that 
strict liability is the correct interpretation of this statute.  In addition, it 
provides support for including incidental and unintentional “takings” 
under the statute. 
1. Strict Liability 
The MBTA makes it unlawful “at any time, by any means or in any 
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, or kill . . . any migratory bird.”102  
Three categories of criminal penalties exist under the MBTA: a Class B 
misdemeanor with no mens rea, a felony for knowingly being involved 
in a sale, and a Class A misdemeanor for helping in the “taking” of a 
migratory bird by baiting.103  This Comment only focuses on the Class B 
misdemeanor violation.104  Recent courts have held that the MBTA is 
not a strict liability statute in that only intentional conduct toward birds 
falls within its restrictions.105  However, this position ignores the logical 
interpretation of the statute.106  Although a strict liability interpretation 
of the MBTA will cause a broad array of consequences, the solution to 
limiting its reach is deciding when and how to apply it, not changing the 
meaning of the statute.107 
Since the inception of the MBTA, the evidence points directly to a 
strict liability interpretation.  First, the plain language of the statute sug-
gests a strict liability interpretation.108  For misdemeanor violations, the 
Act does not provide a mens rea109 requirement to be found liable under 
the provision: for example, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.110  
However, the United States Supreme Court has stated that mere silence 
on a mens rea requirement does not automatically make a statute strict 
liability.111 
 101.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 4. 
 102.  16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a) (2004). 
 103.  16 U.S.C.A. § 707 (1998). 
 104.  This Comment is only focused on the misdemeanor provision in 16 U.S.C.A. § 707(a) 
because it is the only penalty provision that involves the strict liability and incidental take situation. 
 105.  See generally United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D. N.D. 
2012); United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 
2009). 
 106.  See generally Robbins, supra note 61, at 582-83. 
 107.  Id. at 583. 
 108.  United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 109.  Mens rea is the mental element required to find liability under a particular criminal law.  
Robbins, supra note 61, at 583-84. 
 110.  16 U.S.C.A. § 707(a) (1998). 
 111.  See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (stating that strict liability statutes 
are generally disfavored, and because providing the necessary mens rea in a statute is the rule, not 
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To confirm a strict liability reading, there must be evidence, ex-
pressed or implied, that Congress intended that reading.112  The MBTA 
easily meets this standard.113  In 1986, Congress amended the MBTA to 
add the felony violation of selling migratory birds and required a mens 
rea of “knowingly” for this offense.114  Congress did not alter the lack of 
mens rea for the misdemeanor violation and stated: “[n]othing in this 
amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for misde-
meanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a).”115  Evidence of intending 
strict liability for a violation cannot get much stronger than a direct 
statement by Congress. 
Environmental statutes fall within a wide array of public welfare of-
fenses for which “strict liability has been morally and constitutionally 
accepted in such contexts.”116  Strict liability is the most efficient tool 
for enforcing environmental legislation because the threat of criminal 
liability is a better deterrent than its civil counterpart.117  When Congress 
enacts a strict liability statute, it is telling the nation that there is a seri-
ous danger that must be prevented.118  Enacting a strict liability statute 
benefits everyone because “it shifts the risks of dangerous activity to 
those best able to prevent a mishap.”119  Punishing actors that do not in-
tentionally try or succeed in killing a migratory bird is a sacrifice that 
must be made in order to achieve the objectives of the statute and com-
bat the dangers posed by inaction.120 
As stated above, the district court in Brigham Oil & Gas argued 
that the MBTA, as a criminal statute, should be construed narrowly be-
the rare exception, more evidence than silence must be provided to indicate that the legislature in-
tended for the statute to be strict liability). 
 112.  Id. at 606. 
 113.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 582.  “There is little controversy on this issue” of showing 
strict liability for the misdemeanor violation.  Id. 
 114.  United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 115.  S. Rep. No. 99-445, at 16 (1986). 
 116.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 594-95; See also Staples, 511 U.S. at 606 (explaining that 
when it is a public welfare offense “[the Supreme Court] has understood Congress to impose a form 
of strict criminal liability through statutes that do not require the defendant to know the fact that 
make his conduct illegal.  In construing such statutes, [the Supreme Court has] inferred from silence 
that Congress did not intend to require proof of mens rea to establish an offense.”). 
 117.  Arensberg, supra note 24, at 428. 
 118.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 596. 
 119.  Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Strict Criminal Liability for Non-
Hunting, Human Caused Bird Deaths, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 315, 330 (1999).  “Strict liability stat-
utes are not meant to punish the vicious will but to put pressure upon the thoughtless and inefficient 
to do their whole duty in the interest of public health or safety or morals.”  Id. at 331. 
 120.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 595-96. 
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cause the activities intended to be included under it were uncertain.121  
However, as this section shows, there is an abundant amount evidence 
that the MBTA was intended to be a strict liability application and, as 
the next section shows, intended to prohibit incidental activities as well. 
2. Incidental Takings 
The next step in interpreting the MBTA is determining whether the 
statute addresses incidental activities that kill or take a migratory bird.  
For the reasons stated below, the Act does address unintentional and in-
cidental activities, as well as intentional acts.122  Ultimately, because the 
Act is strict liability, it is irrelevant whether an activity is conducted with 
the intent to kill or take a migratory bird.123  It is true that when the Act 
was originally enacted, the debate centered on the prohibition of inten-
tional acts that killed or took possession of migratory birds, such as 
hunting or trapping.124  However, since the MBTA’s enactment in 1918, 
new threats to migratory birds have developed that have the same impact 
hunting and capturing did in the early 1900s.125  “Primary administrative 
emphasis” of the MBTA has shifted to combat the multitude of activities 
that incidentally cause the death of migratory birds.126 
In addition, Congress expressed its intent through its choice of 
words.127  By stating that a bird cannot be killed by “any means or in any 
manner,” Congress did not limit violators of the Act to only hunters or 
trappers – it includes any person who kills a migratory bird in any 
way.128  Moreover, the term “kill” in the MBTA’s list of how to commit 
a misdemeanor violation suggests that there will be criminal liability re-
gardless of how the death actually occurred – focusing on the end, not 
the means.129  The court in Moon Lake Electric Association stated that 
 121.  United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 1202, 1211 (D. N.D. 2012). 
 122.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 6. 
 123.  Id.  The majority of federal courts that have examined the MBTA have ruled that the 
strict liability essence of the Act prevents a distinction between intentional or unintentional acts.  Id. 
 124.  55 Cong. Rec. 4400-01. 
 125.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1177.  Some of the new threats that have emerged 
include “hazardous waste pollution, deforestation, [and] the construction of tall buildings and simi-
lar structures.”  Id. 
 126.  Coggins, supra note 10, at 764. 
 127.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1183. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Rachael Abramson, Comment, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act’s Limited Wingspan and 
Alternatives to the Statute: Protecting the Ecosystem Without Crippling Communications Tower 
Development, 12 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 253, 274 (2000).  “The method of death takes a backseat to 
the resultant kill, which exacts liability.”  Id.  This is one point of the application of the MBTA that 
is cause for broad and unheeded consequences. 
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the activities listed under the statute, such as pursuing, killing, and 
wounding, all can be achieved outside of a hunter or poacher capacity.130  
Lastly, the words of the statute support the inclusion of unintentional ac-
tivities because some of the birds it lists as protected are not those that 
are normally hunted.131  If the statute was only meant to include inten-
tional acts, these birds would not have been listed under its protection.132 
Opponents of the inclusion of incidental takings of birds under the 
MBTA have proposed that a comparison between the MBTA and the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) shows that the MBTA is to be narrow-
ly interpreted.133  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has knocked this 
argument down.134  Congress’ definition of “take” as contained in the 
ESA includes conduct that was not made a part of the MBTA, such as 
harass and harm.135  Proponents of this distinction between the two defi-
nitions of “take” posit that, because these activities are more broad than 
those listed in the MBTA and Congress never went back to add these to 
the MBTA after enacting the ESA, it must have been Congress’ intent to 
make the ESA’s definition of “take” more broad than its MBTA coun-
terpart.136  The Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon,137 however, held that the words that 
describe “harm” in the ESA’s definition of “take” “refer to actions or ef-
fects that do not require direct applications of force.”138  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that even though the ESA includes a few more 
activities under “take,” there is no effect on the inclusion of unintention-
al acts under the MBTA.139 
Not only has the Supreme Court ruled that “take” under the MBTA 
includes incidental deaths, but also, in 2001, President Bill Clinton is-
sued Executive Order 13186 to clarify that an incidental “taking” of a 
 130.  United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
 131.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1183.  For example, the treaty with Canada that ulti-
mately led to and was incorporated into the MBTA highlighted migratory insectivorous birds as 
being protected.  Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 170.  These birds “are never hunted commer-
cially, and because of their small size are rarely shot for any reason;” this provides evidence that the 
treaty negotiators did not intend protection only of bird victims of hunting.  Coggins & Patti, supra 
note 10, at 170-71. 
 132.  Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 170-71. 
 133.  Means, supra note 34, at 828. 
 134.  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 701 (1995). 
 135.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19). 
 136.  Means, supra note 34, at 827-28. 
 137.  Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. at 687. 
 138.  Id. at 701. 
 139.  Julie Lurman, Agencies in Limbo: Migratory Birds and Incidental Take by Federal Agen-
cies, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 39, 49 (2007). 
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migratory bird is a violation under the MBTA.140 
It is clear from the weight of authority that the MBTA was enacted 
with the intent to have strict liability as its enforcement measure.  Under 
the strict liability scheme and the framework that Congress set out in the 
text of the Act, it is safe to say that incidental or unintentional acts that 
result in the death of a migratory bird fall under the MBTA, and criminal 
liability could be the outcome for the actor. 
B. Need for a Solution 
The MBTA’s strict liability undoubtedly has a broad scope of po-
tential violators.  This broad application has led to varying decisions by 
federal courts.141  The varying decisions are the only real determination 
of the scope of the Act; thus, the uncertainty that stems from the judg-
ments on both ends of the spectrum creates an unsettling confusion 
about what kinds of activities are subject to criminal liability.  If the spir-
it of the MBTA is to be upheld and enforced, realistically, an effective 
limiting principle must be put in place to prevent the “over-
inclusiveness” of the statute’s prohibitions.142  The Departments of Inte-
rior and Justice need to band together and develop a clear limiting solu-
tion that embraces the spirit of the MBTA while giving unintentional vi-
olators a proactive option.  This section highlights the severe 
consequences that will result from the Act’s broad reach and the lack of 
uniformity surrounding its implementation.  Finally, this section analyz-
es the prosecutorial discretion theory and explains why this is neither an 
efficient nor effective way to remedy the broad reach of the Act’s prohi-
bitions. 
1. Consequences of the MBTA’s Broad Reach 
A strict application of the MBTA, without any exceptions, would 
create a never-ending scope of potential liability.143  It would be “an un-
controllably expansive criminal law.”144  Professor Kalyani Robbins 
stated that “Congress made a sweeping prohibition that would be unreal-
istic to enforce – a prohibition that could, at some point, touch nearly 
 140.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1186. 
 141.  See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D. N.D. 2012); but 
see United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999). 
 142.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 605. 
 143.  Lurman, supra note 139, at 40.  “If the prohibition against incidentally taking migratory 
birds was uniformly and strictly enforced, development activity in Alaska would likely grind to a 
halt.”  Id. 
 144.  Means, supra note 34, at 833. 
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everyone’s activities – and then asked the Secretary to carve out an en-
forceable plan.”145  “In some situations, the MBTA would impose crimi-
nal liability on a person for the death of a bird under circumstances 
where no criminal liability would be imposed for even the death of an-
other person.”146  Strict liability would reach all actors that killed a mi-
gratory bird, including a homeowner who installs windows that stand in 
the way of a bird’s path.147 
The uncertainty as to whether an actor’s lawful actions that indi-
rectly cause the death of a migratory bird could be a violation of the 
MBTA and therefore, subject the actor to a hefty fine, is one of the most 
important reasons to settle the dispute over the interpretation of the 
Act.148  For example, approximately 444,000 avian deaths occur each 
year due to lawfully operated onshore wind turbines.149  Because the 
MBTA is strict liability with no exceptions for incidental deaths and co-
vers almost all species of birds,150 there may be no way for wind power 
companies, in this instance, to avoid liability under the MBTA.151  Mer-
edith Blaydes Lilley and Jeremy Firestone commented on this uncertain-
ty: 
By criminalizing the take of migratory birds without a permit and sim-
ultaneously granting no permits whatsoever for incidental take, the 
MBTA creates a conundrum for entities engaged in an array of land 
uses that might result in, albeit unintentionally, migratory bird 
deaths.152 
This uncertainty will make creating new companies or moving locations 
less attractive for business owners because they could be in violation of 
the MBTA without doing anything unlawful.153 
Studies within the last several years have shown a decline in the 
bird populations in the United States; thus, to counteract these statistics, 
 145.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 605. 
 146.  Means, supra note 34, at 833. 
 147.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 2. 
 148.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 4.  In 2009, an electrical transmission company and an oil and 
gas production company were each subject to multi-million dollar penalties under the misdemeanor 
violation of the MBTA.  Id.  “More generally, under the misdemeanor provision an actor could be 
subject to fines up to $15,000 and/or imprisonment for up to six months.”  Id. at 3. 
 149.  Thaler, supra note 5, at 1138.  Interestingly, this number is less than the number of deaths 
that occur each year due to windows, cars, and similar common, everyday things.  Id. 
 150.  Hadassah M. Reimer & Sandra A. Snodgrass, Tortoises, Bats, and Birds, Oh My: Pro-
tected-Species Implications for Renewable Energy Projects, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 545, 566 (2010).  
More specifically, the Act covers all species except for those that are exotic or invasive.  Id. 
 151.  Thaler, supra note 5, at 1138-39. 
 152.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1181. 
 153.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
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prosecution under the MBTA will likely increase.154  The increase in 
MBTA prosecutions will open up many unsuspecting actors to liability, 
and without a proactive solution for the actors to prevent this, they will 
suffer the taint of criminal liability and hefty fines.155 
Congress knows of the broad interpretations being given to the 
MBTA, and it has chosen not to make any amendment that will limit its 
scope.156  Therefore, it is up to the FWS to be the “gatekeeper for proper 
implementation of the statute” and create a realistic method of applying 
the MBTA that still adheres to the Act’s spirit and goals.157 
2. Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Downfalls 
The FWS has been using prosecutorial discretion as the limiting 
principle to make MBTA application more realistic.158  This principle 
provides that, though an act is technically a violation of the MBTA, the 
actor will not be prosecuted because the prosecutor chooses not to.159  
For example, if a bird dies because of flying into your window, you will 
not be prosecuted.160  However, because enforcement of the MBTA un-
der this theory depends on an unpredictable discretionary judgment, it is 
not the most efficient or effective solution to limit the broad scope of 
strict liability under the Act. 
Norman L. Reimer, Executive Director of the National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, stated that “prosecutorial discretion has 
become a blank check.”161  The FWS does not have a set prosecutorial 
policy or any guidelines on how to exercise its discretion in enforcing 
the MBTA.162  How is this an effective limiting principle if the enforcing 
agency implements it on a whim?  The lack of guidance and  set policy 
objectives has only continued to expand the scope of the Act, and prose-
cution has become an unlikely event due to the lack of personnel and 
other resources within the FWS.163  As a result, the lack of prosecution 
 154.  Id. at 2. 
 155.  Id. at 2. 
 156.  Lurman, supra note 139, at 60. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1197. 
 159.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 2. 
 160.  Id. at 2. 
 161.  Reimer, supra note 77, at 9.  Reimer posited that there is overcriminalization under the 
MBTA because of the emotions involved: for example, seeing birds covered in oil.  Id. 
 162.  Robbins, supra note 61, at 605-06. 
 163.  Lilley & Firestone, supra note 4, at 1197-98.  “[W]hat is the likelihood of prosecuting the 
virtually limitless number of activities that can cause the death of migratory birds?  [E]nforcing 
agencies usually do not have sufficient personnel or funds to pursue all possible violations of the 
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in some areas has created a false sense of security among industry actors 
because they believe they are now exempt.164  However, prosecutorial 
discretion could change in an instant, killing that false belief.165  This is 
especially true because prosecution under the MBTA is projected to in-
crease in the near future due to decreasing bird populations. 166  Those 
actors will therefore suffer the change in discretion and no longer benefit 
from the ambivalent safety net. 
This theoretical solution is unpredictable because the prosecution 
depends on the administration that is in office at the time.167  Each time 
the administration changes, the scope of the discretion will likely change 
to reflect the new administration’s objectives.168  The strict liability as-
pect of the MBTA makes enforcement more likely to be affected by am-
bitions for higher office.169  If a prosecutor applies the Act’s prohibitions 
more broadly, he or she will likely achieve more convictions because of 
the all-encompassing strict liability.170  Essentially, the criminal justice 
under the MBTA would ultimately depend on the “conscience and cir-
cumspection in prosecuting officers.”171 
Another downfall of prosecutorial discretion occurs when the FWS 
makes a promise but does not back it with a guarantee.172  The FWS has 
stated that it will focus its enforcement and prosecution of the MBTA on 
those actors that have a disregard for the Act’s policies.173  For example, 
the FWS could use its prosecutorial discretion and choose not to prose-
cute actors when they have taken measures to mitigate the impact of 
“taking” any protected birds.174  However, despite a promise to not pros-
ecute, there is no concrete, expressed authorization to conduct the activi-
ty in accordance with mitigation measures, and incidentally take a bird, 
without the looming threat of prosecution.175  This lack of a guarantee 
laws they administer.”  Id (internal quotations omitted). 
 164.  Lurman, supra note 139, at 46. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 2. 
 167.  Means, supra note 34, at 834-35. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Abramson, supra note 129, at 280-81. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Corcoran, supra note 119, at 345 (internal quotations omitted). 
 172.  Shippen Howe, The Intersection of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Energy Compa-
nies: An Uncertain Crossroad, 41 No.5 ABA TRENDS. 1, 14 (2010). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Thaler, supra note 5, at 1139.  An example of this discretion took place when the FWS 
teamed up with Edison Electric Institute’s Avian Power Line Interaction Committee to develop pro-
tection plans, and the FWS impliedly agreed not to prosecute any bird deaths resulting from these 
actors’ conduct under the MBTA.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
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will make actors feel exposed to liability and will impede further large-
scale development.176 
The discretion to prosecute a violator of the MBTA could depend 
on the type of activity the actor is engaged in that caused the “taking” of 
the bird.177  Senators David Vitter of Louisiana and Lamar Alexander of 
Tennessee wrote a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder, arguing that 
prosecution under the MBTA has discriminately targeted oil and gas 
production companies, while wind power projects have been given a 
“free pass.”178  The Senators sought a clarification on the enforcement 
policy of the MBTA because one legal energy business was being prose-
cuted for killing birds while another legal energy business was not being 
prosecuted for killing birds.179  The decision to prosecute was being de-
termined, according to the Senators, by the administration’s hostile 
views toward traditional oil and gas energy production versus the more 
open view toward renewable energy production, like wind power.180  
Regardless of whether this is the reason why wind power facilities have 
not been prosecuted while their oil and gas counterparts have continually 
faced prosecution under the MBTA, it is additional evidence to show 
that prosecutorial discretion is unpredictable and really can be a “blank 
check;”181 the Department of Justice can simply decide to prosecute one 
violator while letting another, who could be equally liable,182 off the 
hook. 
A reliance on prosecutorial discretion allows the courts to avoid es-
tablishing a concrete rule as to how the MBTA should be applied.183  
Some advocates of hardline environmental enforcement might approve 
of the unpredictability and instability.184  The uncertainty would ensure 
the deterrence of actors who might incidentally kill a bird during the 
course of their business because they know there is always the chance of 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Vitter, Alexander Say Administration’s Policy on Endangered Species Has Ridiculous 
Inconsistencies, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Words Press Releases (Jan. 30, 
2013), 
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentReco
rd_id=a4b146be-90b8-38d7-1a0e-113a580a4672. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Reimer, supra note 77, at 9. 
 182.  See Thaler, supra note 5, at 1138 (explaining that approximately 444,000 birds are killed 
by wind power facilities each year). 
 183.  Means, supra note 34, at 835-36. 
 184.  Id. at 835. 
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prosecution.185  However, the invisible rule would create too broad of a 
prohibition and would deter other crucial things, such as economic de-
velopment.186  In addition, it does not set a good precedent for future 
courts faced with determining how to apply the strict liability because it 
can be ever changing.187 
One feasible argument to keep prosecutorial discretion as the limit-
ing principle on the MBTA’s span is to exercise the discretion in sen-
tencing as well as in which cases are prosecuted.188  Under this discre-
tion, the Department of Justice could suggest minimal punishments for 
those actors who are more “innocent” than others are.189  Though this 
theory recognizes that some actors who are prosecuted under the MBTA 
were not intentionally trying to kill birds and should be punished less, it 
is entirely subjective and would result in the same problems that prose-
cutorial discretion poses in general.190  In addition, Congress created the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines to end sentencing discretion in oth-
er contexts because it should be assumed that anyone awaiting punish-
ment after a trial is not innocent and should not be afforded special 
treatment.191 
There is one application of prosecutorial discretion that should still 
be implemented under the Act.  This is the discretion to not prosecute 
the absurd, technical violations of the MBTA, such as migratory birds 
being killed by cars, house windows, or planes.192  For all of the negative 
and unstable concerns that come with prosecutorial discretion, it is still 
solely responsible for ensuring these absurd violations are exempted.193  
Moreover, if the implemented limiting principle is the incidental take 
permit program like that under the ESA, the government should not ex-
pect a homeowner or an airplane manufacturer to apply for a permit, out-
line a mitigation plan, and spend the money to implement it.  Therefore, 
prosecutorial discretion should still apply in the context of the absurd vi-
olations. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 2.  Project developers and other businesses would be skeptical 
when taking on a new business venture or altering an existing operation because of the threat of 
prosecution under the MBTA and the resulting taint of criminal liability.  Id. 
 187.  Means, supra note 34, at 835-36. 
 188.  Corcoran, supra note 119, at 342. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id.  What constitutes a minimal punishment compared to a severe punishment is hard to 
determine when different people have different feelings about what is minimal and what is severe.  
Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Corcoran, supra note 119, at 346. 
 193.  Id. 
 
23
Fiest: Defining the Wingspan
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
07 FIEST MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2014  9:29 AM 
610 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:587 
Though prosecutorial discretion is  the limiting principle relied up-
on today, it is not the most efficient or effective way of dealing with the 
broad scope of the MBTA.  The unpredictable and unguided nature of 
this limiting technique transcends state borders and leaves actors across 
the country potentially facing criminal liability without any real proac-
tive redress.  The implemented solution must be a concrete rule that can 
be uniformly applied and predicted. 
C. Granting Permits for Incidental Takes 
The most realistic and effective solution the FWS can implement to 
effectively enforce the MBTA is to follow the permit program under the 
ESA for incidental takings.194  The permit program has worked for the 
ESA for almost 40 years, and as the ESA contains a very similar “take” 
prohibition,195 the permit program would most likely have the same suc-
cessful effect on MBTA implementation.  The most effective way to im-
plement this solution is to have Congress amend the Act to include inci-
dental take permits.  However, Congress has made it clear by its inaction 
thus far that it is leaving it to the FWS to fix the problems with applying 
the MBTA.196  In addition, it is well known that the legislative process is 
a slow one, and the MBTA needs a solution immediately because of the 
current “incidental takers” in the country that can only hope they are not 
a target of prosecution.  Therefore, it will be up to the FWS to create and 
regulate the proposed permit program.  This section analyzes the ESA’s 
permit program and suggests why a similar program would eliminate the 
broad consequences that are possible under the MBTA’s current en-
forcement plan and would finally create a uniform implementation 
measure. 
1. The Permit Program 
The ESA makes it unlawful for any person to “take” a species that 
is listed on the endangered species list under the statute.197  As stated 
above, the United States Supreme Court in Babbitt held that the “take” 
 194.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a). 
 195.  “Take” is defined in the ESA to mean to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”  16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19). 
 196.  Lurman, supra note 139, at 58.  Congress has to be aware of the extremely contrasting 
views that federal courts have given to the very meaning of the MBTA and its application, and the 
fact that it has not acted to amend the statute to clarify its intent suggests that it has abandoned the 
issue and has left it for the FWS to handle.  Id. 
 197.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1538. 
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definition under the ESA includes incidental activities.198  Under the 
ESA’s exceptions, a taking that is otherwise prohibited under the statute 
may be permitted for scientific purposes, to enhance the survival rates of 
the affected species,199 or when the taking is only incidental to the ac-
tor’s otherwise lawful activity.200  These three situations are exempt 
from the ESA’s prohibition only if the Secretary of the Interior chooses 
to grant a permit to the actor.201 
Under the permit program, the actor is not simply granted the per-
mit and then let off the hook for criminal liability if an endangered spe-
cies is taken on his or her watch; instead, requirements must be fol-
lowed.202  Before the permit will be granted, the actor must submit a 
habitat conservation plan (“HCP”).203  At a minimum, this plan must 
contain the impact that will result from this actor’s taking, the steps that 
will be taken to try to prevent these takings, and an explanation for why 
the actor is not conducting his activity in an alternative way that would 
not amount to such a taking.204  The HCP must be made available for 
public comment; then, if the Secretary of Interior determines that the 
take will be incidental and that mitigation measures and funding will be 
adequate, the permit will be issued to the actor.205  The permit and the 
HCP must also comply with the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”), which makes the process even longer for the actor.206  If the 
actor is found not in compliance with the granted permit at any time, the 
permit will be revoked.207 
The primary contention against incorporating an incidental take 
permit program into the MBTA or its regulations is that the FWS lacks 
the resources and personnel to carry it out.208  A creative solution to fix-
 198.  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 701 (1995). 
 199.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(1)(A). 
 200.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(1)(B).  In 1982, the ESA was amended to allow for incidental take 
permits primarily because of a campaign initiated by private economic actors and their qualm with 
the fact that “species with ‘no value’ were squashing projects economically beneficial to humans.”  
Patrick Duggan, Incidental Extinction: How the Endangered Species Act’s Incidental Take Permits 
Fail to Account for Population Loss, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS, 10628, 10628 (2011). 
 201.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a). 
 202.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(i-iii). 
 205.  Duggan, supra note 200, at 10630. 
 206.  Id. at 10631.  Under the ESA, there have been streamlining techniques put in place to 
make the review by NEPA more expedited.  Id.  Because the ESA covers different policies than the 
MBTA, if the incidental take permit program is implemented for the MBTA, the FWS can create a 
similar streamlining technique for these permits. 
 207.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(2)(C). 
 208.  Conrad A. Fjetland, Comment, Possibilities for Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty 
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ing the monetary issue is to implement a price or “bird tax” for applying 
for an incidental take permit.209  The money received by the FWS for 
these permits could be put toward funding the early stages of permit im-
plementation, and once the agency has adequate resources, the money 
could then be used for researching mitigation efforts to further reduce 
incidental takings.210  For example, a bird tax paid by a telecommunica-
tions industry actor could be put toward research to develop a design for 
towers with visual or acoustic devices to make them safer for migrating 
birds.211  Similarly, in the context upon which this Comment has fo-
cused, a bird tax paid by an oil and gas production company could be put 
toward constructing oil reserve pits or tanks safer for birds by designing 
a method of covering them.  The price of this bird tax will be just anoth-
er cost of doing business for the actor and much less than what a misde-
meanor conviction under the MBTA would cost.212 
A technique applied to ESA incidental take programs for the wind 
power industry could be incorporated into an incidental take permit pro-
gram under the MBTA.213  In 2010, the “Smart from the Start” initiative 
was announced by Secretary of the Interior Kenneth Salazar to rapidly 
increase construction of offshore transmission lines for wind projects.214  
This program has reduced the burden on the FWS for this specific re-
gional project “by removing notice requirements and completing exten-
sive feasibility, resource, and environmental studies . . . before projects 
were even proposed.”215  This streamlining program allows for an expe-
dited permit granting process when an industry conducting multiple pro-
jects in a common geographic area applies for the same type of permit.  
In this scenario, the FWS only has to look over the environmental as-
sessment, as a whole, once.216  This program would alleviate the burden 
placed on FWS personnel and its resources because the permit process 
would be shortened for projects that qualify for this streamlining.  In ad-
dition, because some parts of the application will not have to be re-
Act for the Protection of Migratory Birds, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 47, 66 (2000).  It will take ap-
proximately $2,700,000 and 45 more personnel to adequately implement the permit program.  Id. 
 209.  See Abramson, supra note 129, at 285-86 (suggesting a bird tax to bring in funding for 
scientific research). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. at 286. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  J. B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the Endangered Species Act 
Through Administrative Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1781-82 (2012). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id.  The operations that started this streamlining program were the Atlantic offshore wind 
projects.  Id. 
 216.  Id. at 1783. 
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viewed for applicants that are a part of the same geographic area,217 few-
er personnel will be needed to review the applications. 
To address the lack of personnel contention by using the framework 
of the ESA, there will not be the usual, or at least not as much, confusion 
and tentativeness when starting a new project.  As the program is already 
being implemented successfully in another setting, the FWS can attempt 
to integrate that work into its routine for MBTA enforcement. 
2. Why an Incidental Take Permit Program is the Best Solution 
If the FWS created a permit program for the MBTA based on the 
provision under the ESA, it would provide not only the most effective 
solution but also the quickest.  The permit exception under the ESA is 
already in place, and the FWS would have an already-developed struc-
ture to incorporate into the MBTA.  The permit program suggested 
would actually enhance the goals of the MBTA because the actors re-
ceiving the incidental take permits will have to increase their environ-
mental protection and conservation measures.218  The permits are pri-
marily a solution to reduce the all-encompassing liability under the 
statute and, thus, protect the incidental violators; however, because of 
the required implementation of conservation measures, the FWS will al-
so benefit from the hopeful decrease in bird deaths. 
Implementing the ESA’s permit exception into the MBTA regula-
tions will create more certainty among prominent industries that act law-
fully, such as oil and gas drilling companies and wind power facilities.219  
By “buying into” the permit exception, private entities will be able to 
conduct their business lawfully and not suffer the taint of a criminal 
conviction.220  Knowing that there is an option to avoid criminal liabil-
ity, actors will be much less apprehensive when starting a new project, 
expanding an existing project, or moving locations.221  Although a per-
mit program may cause a delay in an actor’s project or development be-
cause of the detailed requirements and steps in the permit process, the 
actors will at least have the certainty of knowing that they will not be 
 217.  This program would be a good option in light of the Brigham Oil & Gas case because all 
three oil companies were operating within the same area and exposing birds to the same potential 
dangers. 
 218.  16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 219.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
 220.  See 16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a) (2004) (stating that it is only unlawful under the Act to take a 
migratory bird if there has been no permit granted).  In my opinion, choosing to buy into a permit 
program that also serves as a mitigation measure will earn the companies a better goodwill reputa-
tion within the community, as well. 
 221.  Snodgrass, supra note 9, at 2. 
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prosecuted so long as they follow the terms of the permit.222 
This program would be a “win-win” situation for both sides of the 
issue.  Private actors will be able to attain a safeguard from potential 
criminal liability as long as they maintain otherwise lawful activities.  
They will have the security of doing business with no apprehension of 
violating the statute.  On the other hand, the MBTA will not be just giv-
ing in.  Under the program, the FWS will benefit from conservation and 
mitigation measures that these actors must undertake in order to receive 
the permit.  As the actors will be paying to apply for a permit, the FWS 
will receive funding to conduct research into other mitigation methods or 
to sustain its resources under the program.  This solution would provide 
the most realistic way of applying the broad MBTA and still adhere to 
the original intended spirit of the Act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The MBTA is a strict liability statute that includes prohibition of 
not only intentional takings but also incidental takings of migratory 
birds.  The weight of authority supports both of these propositions.  Be-
cause the MBTA is a strict liability statute and its prohibitions technical-
ly have no real limitations, a clear and certain limiting principle must be 
implemented to prevent severe consequences.  The extreme division 
among the federal district courts on how to interpret and apply the Act 
proves the dire need for an immediate solution. 
The current method for limiting the MBTA’s reach is prosecutorial 
discretion.  This theory is not the most efficient way to limit the MBTA 
because it ultimately goes against the spirit of the MBTA by prosecuting 
some violators but voluntarily choosing not to prosecute others.  In addi-
tion, the principle of discretion provides no clear guidance or predicta-
bility for actors that may incidentally violate the Act. 
The best solution to address the broad reach of the MBTA’s liabil-
ity is for the FWS to implement an incidental take permit program that is 
similar to the one under the ESA.  Some industry actors, like oil and gas 
production companies and wind power facilities, will continue to unin-
tentionally kill birds as they continue their lawful business activities.  
Though the MBTA makes it a crime to allow such deaths, industries that 
provide energy independence to the United States are not going to pack 
up shop and stop their business—nor do we want them to do so.  This 
incidental take permit plan will allow industry actors the security of 
 222.  Thaler, supra note 5, at 1137. 
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knowing they will not face criminal liability for accidentally taking a 
migratory bird, but it will also benefit the FWS by providing additional 
conservation assistance because of the mitigation measures the actor 
must put in place to receive the permit.  An incidental take permit pro-
gram for the MBTA will help achieve the goals for which the Act was 
enacted. 
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